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Agostini v. Felton: Redefining the
Establishment of Religion Through a
Modification of the Lemon Test
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion ....'
I. INTRODUCTION
The Establishment Clause requires that government must maintain neutrality
toward religion.' Neutrality is difficult, however, where education is involved.
This difficulty arises when the government passes laws affecting all school
children because such laws will inevitably affect school children who attend
parochial schools. One such difficulty is the ability of the states to comply with
Congressional educational mandates requiring equal treatment to all school
children without offending the Constitution.
Even though there is no fundamental right to an education,' public policy
strongly favors education.4 In 1923, the Supreme Court noted, "American people
1. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
2. Although courts continue to debate the meaning of neutrality, the Supreme Court delineated the
minimal threshold of what the Establishment Clause requires:
Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither can pass laws which
aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another. Neither can force nor
influence a person to go to or to remain away from church against his will or force him to
profess a belief or disbelief in any religion. No person can be punished for entertaining or
professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church attendance or non-attendance. No tax in
any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any religious activities or institutions,
whatever they may be called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice religion.
Neither a state nor the Federal Government can, openly or secretly, participate in the affairs
of any religious organizations or groups and vice versa. In the words of Jefferson, the clause
against establishment of religion by law was intended to erect "a wall of separation between
church and State."
Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947) (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145,
164 (1878)).
3. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973).
4. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) (finding that it is unreasonable to
expect a child to have a successful life without the opportunity to be educated); see also Plyler v. Doe,
457 U.S. 202, 221 (1982) ("[E]ducation has a fundamental role in maintaining'the fabric of our
society.").
have always regarded education and acquisition of knowledge as matters of
supreme importance."5 Even so, there has been great debate over who should
provide education.6 All parents must send their school-age children to either a
public or a private school.7 But important questions arise over how much
governmental involvement is allowed in providing for students in parochial schools
without offending the Establishment Clause.8 In the recent Agostini v. Felton9
decision, the Court decided to address this issue."0
This Note will examine the facts surrounding the Agostini decision, the
reasoning of the decision, and the impact the decision will have on the litigation
and debate of future similar issues. In Part II the historical background of Agostini
is discussed. Part III contains a detailed explanation of the factual development
of the Agostini litigation. 2 Part IV analyzes the majority and dissenting opinions. 3
Part V explores Agostini's probable impact.'4 The Note concludes with a brief
summary in Part VI. 5
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Constitutional problems often arise when government aid is offered, either
directly or indirectly, to parochial schools. 6 Modernjudicial history is replete with
litigation of such problems.
In Everson v. Board of Education,7 the Court found a New Jersey statute
providing for the reimbursement of bus fares expended on students attending
5. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390,400 (1923) (noting that parents' acknowledgment of a duty
to educate their children is evidenced by the existence of compulsory education laws in almost every
state in the country).
6. See William Bently Ball, Economic Freedom of Parental Choice in Education: The
Pennsylvania Constitution, 101 DICK. L. REV. 261, 261-62 (1997).
7. See id. at 262; see also Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (holding that
parents could discharge their duty under compulsory education laws by sending their children to a
parochial school instead of a public school if the parochial school met the educational requirements
imposed by the state).
8. In 1987, Justice Brennan observed, "[t]he Court has been particularly vigilant in monitoring
compliance with the Establishment Clause." Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 583-84 (1987).
9. 117 S. Ct. 1997 (1997).
10. However, some important issues were left unresolved and only future litigation will further
clarify these issues. This Note will address these issues, including the constitutionality of voucher
programs, the new role of the Lemon Test in Establishment Clause cases, and the use of Rule 60(b) as
an appropriate vehicle to seek readjudication.
11. See infra notes 16-62 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 63-91 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 92-201 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 202-59 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 260-63 and accompanying text.
16. See, e.g., Developments in the Law--Religion and the State, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1606, 1675-
1702 (1987) (examining constitutional issues arising out of state aid to religious activities).
17. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
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parochial schools constitutional.' 8 The Everson Court concluded that because the
statute involved was generally applicable and supported by a valid state interest of
keeping children in school, the statute did not violate the Establishment Clause. 9
Moreover, in Board of Education v. Allen,2° the Court held a New York law
providing for the loaning of textbooks to parochial school students to be
constitutional because "no funds or books are furnished to parochial schools, and
the financial benefit is to parents and children, not to schools."'"
The 1971 landmark decision of Lemon v. Kurtzman22 established a three-
pronged test to be used in deciding Establishment Clause cases.23 Applying its
newly-created test, the Lemon Court found state supplements to the salaries of
parochial school teachers unconstitutional.24
In 1973, the Court ruled in two cases, Committee for Public Education and
Religious Liberty v. Nyquist and Sloan v. Lemon,26 that it is impermissible for a
state to reimburse parents who send their children to private schools.27
Following the 1973 decisions denying benefits to parents of private school
children, the Court issued a series of decisions allowing state support for certain
programs in religious schools. In Meek v. Pittenger," the Court found no
constitutional violation in allowing states to lend textbooks to parochial schools.29
This decision, however, was not extended to other educational materials.3" In
Roemer v. Board of Public Works,3' the Court found a program providing state
grants to private and religious schools constitutional. 2 In Committee for Public
Education v. Regan,33 the Court held that there was no constitutional problem with
18. See id. at 17.
19. See id.
20. 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
21. See id. at 243-44.
22. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
23. "First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect
must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute must not foster 'an excessive
government entanglement with religion."' Id. at 612-13 (citation omitted) (quoting Walz v. Tax
Commission, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970)). Even though these three standards appear straightforward,
the "Lemon Test" has been the subject of an on-going debate and remains controversial. See infra notes
227-39 and accompanying text.
24. See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 625.
25. 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
26. 413 U.S. 825 (1973).
27. See Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 780-81; Sloan, 413 U.S. at 828.
28. 421 U.S. 349 (1975).
29. See id. at 362.
30. See id.
31. 426 U.S. 736 (1976).
32. See id. at 766-67.
33. 444 U.S. 646 (1980).
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a state reimbursing a parochial school for the cost of giving a standardized test."
Finally, in Mueller v. Allen,35 the Court upheld a law allowing for a state income
tax deduction for amounts paid for tuition, books, and transportation of school
children.36
Following this stint of approving state programs aiding parochial schools, the
Court swung back to the other side and began invalidating these types of state
programs. In School District of Grand Rapids v. Ball,37 the school district initiated
programs whereby public school teachers provided instruction in leased classrooms
on both public and private school campuses; most of the private school campuses
were parochial.3 The Ball Court held that the challenged programs violated the
Establishment Clause.39 The Court reasoned that the programs violated Lemon's
second prong because they advanced religion by providing aid to parochial
schools. 4° In Aguilar v. Felton,4 a companion case to Ball, taxpayers challenged
the use of government funds for private schools.42 The Aguilar Court held that the
use of Title I funds to pay the salaries of government employees providing services
on the campuses of private parochial schools violated the Establishment Clause.aS
The Court reasoned that this activity violated the excessive entanglement prong of
the Lemon Test." In Board of Education v. Grumet,45 a state statute created a
separate school district to serve a religious community.46 The Grumet Court held
that the use of public funds to finance a parochial school district was unconstitu-
tional.47
In 1993, the Court upheld one state program that provided support to a
parochial school. In Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District,a" the Court held
that the state did not violate the Establishment Clause by providing a sign-
interpreter to a deaf student attending a parochial school.49
34. See id. at 662.
35. 463 U.S. 388 (1983).
36. See id. at 402-04.
37. 473 U.S. 373 (1985), overruled in part by Agostini v. Felton, 117 S. Ct. 1997, 2003 (1997).
38. See id. at 375. The Ball Court examined two programs, the Shared Time program and the
Community Education program. See id. at 375-76. In the Shared Time program public school teachers
offered classes to students on both public and parochial campuses during the school day. See id. In the
Community Education program, public school teachers offered instruction to both children and adults
after school hours. See id.
39. See id. at 397.
40. See id.
41. 473 U.S. 402 (1985), overruled by Agostini v. Felton, 117 S. Ct. 1997 (1997).
42. See id. at 407.
43. See id. at 413-14.
44. See id. at 413.
45. 512 U.S. 687 (1994).
46. See id. at 690.
47. See id.
48. 509 U.S. 1 (1993).
49. See id. at 14.
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It was in this milieu that the Court heard the Agostini v. Felton case. Agostini
originated in Brooklyn, where the school board was having difficulty with a
Congressional mandate that entitled all children to state-provided remedial classes,
regardless of whether the students attended state schools.5" In trying to comply
with the Congressional mandate, Title I, the New York City Board of Education
("NY Board") found itself in court defending claims that it had violated the
Establishment Clause." "Congress enacted Title I of the Elementary and
Secondary Education Act of 196552 [("Education Act")] to 'provid[e] full
educational opportunity to every child regardless of economic background."' 53
Title I funds were allocated by the federal government through States to local
educational agencies, or "LEAs."'  School boards, a typical form of LEA, found
it economically difficult to comply with this Act, particularly when providing the
mandated services to students in private schools." The NY Board encountered
these same problems.56 In Aguilar v. Felton,57 the Court held that New York could
not comply with Title I by sending public school teachers onto the campuses of
50. See Agostini v. Felton, 117 S. Ct. 1997, 2003-04 (1997); Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402,406
(1985), overruled by Agostini v. Felton, 117 S. Ct. 1997 (1997).
51. See Agostini, 117 S. Ct. at 2005.
52. Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-10, 79 Stat. 27 (1965)
(codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 6301-6321). Although Title I was originally enacted as part of
President Lyndon Johnson's Great Society, it has been repealed and reenacted in various forms since
first being enacted in 1965. See Mark E. Chopko, Religious Access to Public Programs and
Environmental Funding, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 645, 659 (1992). In October of 1982, Chapter I of
the Education Consolidation and Improvement Act of 1981 ("Chapter ") superseded Title 1. See 20
U.S.C. §§ 3801-3808 (repealed 1988); Aguilar, 473 U.S. at 404 n.1. However, the provisions of
Chapter I that related to private school children did not differ significantly from those in Title I. See
Aguilar, 473 U.S. at 404 n. 1. A new version of the program was enacted in the Augustus F. Hawkins-
Robert T. Stafford Elementary and Secondary School Amendments of 1988. See Augustus F. Hawkins-
Robert T. Stafford Elementary and Secondary School Improvement Amendments of 1988, Pub. L. No.
100-297, 102 Stat. 130. On July 1, 1995, Chapter I became known again as 'Title r' by the Improving
America's Schools Act of 1994. See Improving America's School Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-382,
108 Stat. 3518. Even though the 1994 Act significantly changed the program, the Agostini Court
concluded that those changes did not materially affect the issues that had been decided in Aguilar. See
Agostini, 117 S. Ct. at 2003 n.*. For purposes of this Note, the federally-funded program which
provided remedial instruction and services to qualified elementary and secondary school children will
be referred to as Title 1. See id.
53. Agostini, 117 S. Ct. at 2003 (citation omitted) (quoting S. REP. No. 89-146, at 5 (1965)).
54. See 20 U.S.C. §§ 6311, 6312; Agostini, 117 S. Ct. at 2003 (noting the additional steps LEAs
had to take in implementing Title I in parochial schools).
55. See Agostini, 117 S. Ct. at 2004.
56. See id.
57. 473 U.S. 402 (1985).
parochial schools.5" New York incurred great expense in complying with Aguilar
and its ensuing injunction. 9 This led the NY Board, in Agostini, to seek
reconsideration of the Aguilar ruling, arguing that Aguilar was no longer good
law.' In Agostini, Justice O'Connor, writing for a five-to-four majority, held that
Aguilar was no longer good law,6 and the New York City Board of Education
could comply with the Title I mandate by sending public school teachers onto the
campuses of private schools.62
III. FACTUAL HISTORY
As part of President Johnson's Great Society program, Congress enacted Title
I of the Education Act.63 In order for a student to qualify for assistance pursuant
to the Act, a student had to "reside[] within the attendance boundaries of a public
school located in a low-income area," and had to be "failing, or[] at risk of failing,
the State's student performance standards."'  Title I funds could not be used to
supplant regular classroom instruction, but merely to supplement instruction when
needed.65 These funds were provided to the states, which, in turn, dispersed the
funds to LEAs.66 LEAs were required to provide Title I services to secular and
religious private school students as well as to public school students on an
equitable basis.67 Private schools, however, could only use Title I funds to meet
students' needs and not the private schools' needs.68 Public employees had to
provide Title I services to private school children in a "secular, neutral, and
nonideological"'69 fashion.7° Moreover, Title I funds for private school children
were to remain under the control of the public agency.7' Although officials of
private schools could be consulted regarding Tile I services, the ultimate decision
on how to use the funds rested solely in the hands of the public agency.72
58. See id. at 426 (holding that sending public school teachers onto parochial school grounds
created an "entanglement" of state and religion that violated the Establishment Clause).
59. See Agostini, 117 S. Ct. at 2005 (observing that additional costs incurred by New York after
Aguilar averaged $15 million per year).
60. See id. at 2003.
61. See id. at 2017.
62. See id. at 2016.
63. See supra note 52.
64. See Agostini, 117 S. Ct. at 2003-04 (citing 20 U.S.C. §§ 6313(a)(2)(B), 6315(b)(l)(B)).
65. See id. at 2004 (citing 34 C.F.R. § 200.12(a) (1996)).
66. See id. at 2003 (citing 20 U.S.C. §§ 6311, 6312).
67. See id. at 2004 (citing 20 U.S.C. §§ 6312(c)(1)(F), 6321(a)(3)).
68. See id. (comparing 34 C.F.R. § 200.12(b) with 20 U.S.C. § 6314 which "allow[s] 'schoolwide'
programs at public schools").
69. 20 U.S.C. § 6321(a)(2) (Supp. 1998).
70. See Agostini, 117 S. Ct. at 2004 (citing 20 U.S.C. § 632 1(c)(2)).
71. See id. (citing 20 U.S.C. § 6321(c)(l)-(2)).
72. See id. at 2004-05 (citing 20 U.S.C. § 6321(b) and 34 C.F.R. § 200.1l(b)(3)).
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The NY Board first applied for Title I funds in 1966."3 Almost immediately
the dilemma arose of how to provide Title I services to private school students, thus
prompting the NY Board to implement various plans.74 The NY Board's first plan
was to transport the private school students to public school campuses where Title
I services were being offered after school.75 This plan proved largely unsuccessful
because of poor attendance, fatigue of teachers and students, and concern by
parents for students' safety.76
With the failure of the first plan, an immediate need arose for another method
of providing Title I services. Under the second plan, Title I services were offered
on private school campuses after regular school hours.77 This plan was the actual
method of compliance that Congress intended when Title I was originally enacted.78
However, this plan also proved largely unsuccessful.79
The third plan implemented by the NY Board ran into litigation before its
educational effectiveness could truly be tested." Under this plan, Title I services
were offered on private school campuses during regular school hours. 1 Only
public employees, however, could provide the Title I services. 2 Such services
could be provided without deference to the wishes of the private school or the
religious preferences of the public employee. 3 Numerous protective measures
were instituted to ensure that there would be no inculcation of religion among the
public employees providing the services: supervisors circulated amongst the
private schools to check in on the public school teachers, and religious symbols
were to be removed from any classroom where Title I services were provided.'
73. See id. at 2004.
74. See id. (realizing that 10% of students qualifying for Title I services attended private schools
and 90% of the private schools were parochial).
75. See id.
76. See id.
77. See id.
78. See id. (citing Wheeler v. Barrera, 417 U.S. 402, 422 (1974)).
79. See id.
80. See id. at 2004-05.
81. See id. at 2004.
82. See id. Public school employees that would provide Title I services on private school campuses
were given the following guidelines: they were accountable only to public school supervisors; they were
to select the children who qualified for Title I services and were to only provide Title I services to those
students; they were to only use their materials to provide Title I services; they were not allowed to "team
teach" with the private school teachers; and they could not inculcate religion into their teaching nor
could they participate in any of the private schools' religious activities. See id.
83. See id. at 2004.
84. See id. at 2004-05.
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In 1978, six taxpayers brought suit to challenge the constitutionality of this
third program. 5 In Aguilar v. Felton, these six taxpayers sued to enjoin the use of
Title I funds to pay the salaries of public school teachers who provided remedial
instruction to parochial school students on the campuses of the parochial schools. 6
The Court applied the Lemon Test to determine whether the Establishment Clause
had been violated. 7 The Aguilar Court held that use of Title I funds in this manner
violated the Establishment Clause and affirmed the lower court's issuance of an
injunction."8 The Court reasoned that the use of funds in this manner constituted
excessive entanglement, thereby failing the third prong of the Lemon Test. 9
With the third plan uprooted by the Court, the NY Board encountered
substantial difficulties in complying with the Aguilar injunction.' These
difficulties led to the Agostini litigation, where the Court was urged to reconsider
its twelve-year-old Aguilar ruling.9'
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE OPINIONS
A. Justice O'Connor's Majority Opinion
Justice O'Connor began the majority opinion with an examination of Title I
and a history of the difficulties encountered by the City of New York in implement-
ing a Title I program.92 Title I required that an LEA, receiving Title I funds,
provide remedial educational services to all school children,93 including parochial
school students.94 The NY Board found it difficult to comply with the requirement
because Title I services in private schools were much more restricted as compared
to the same services provided in public schools.9 Under the restrictions,; New
85. See Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 407 (1985), overruled by Agostini v. Felton, 117 S. Ct.
1997 (1997).
86. See id. at 404-06.
87. See id. at412-13.
88. See id. at414.
89. See id. at 413; see also Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602,612-13 (1971) (setting forth a three-
part test to determine Establishment Clause violations).
90. See Agostini, 117 S. Ct. at 2005.
91. See id. at 2005-06.
92. See id. at 2003-06.
93. See 20 U.S.C. §§ 6301-6303 (1994) (stating the rules applied in furthering disadvantaged
children); S. REP. No. 89-146, at 5 (1965).
94. See Agostini, 117 S. Ct. at 2004.
95. See id. Justice O'Connor succinctly outlined these restrictions at the beginning of the majority
opinion:
Title I services may be provided only to those private school students eligible for aid, and
cannot be used to provide services on a "school-wide" basis. Compare 34 C.F.R. § 200.12(b)
with 20 U.S.C. § 6314 (allowing "school-wide" programs at public schools). In addition, the
LEA must retain complete control over Title I funds; retain title to all materials used to provide
Title I services; and provide those services through public employees or other persons
[Vol. 26: 407, 1999] Agostini v. Felton
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York implemented various programs to provide remedial services to private school
children with varying results.96 The final attempted program led to litigation
demanding injunctive relief and claiming that the program violated the Constitu-
tion's Establishment Clause.97 This litigation culminated in a divided Court
holding the program unconstitutional and issuing a permanent injunction.9" After
the injunction, the NY Board encountered even greater difficulties in implementing
an effective Title I program.99 In 1995, because of these newfound difficulties, the
NY Board and a group of parents of parochial school students" filed for relief
from the Aguilar injunction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) ("Rule
60(b)").101
After outlining the history of the case, Justice O'Connor discussed whether
Rule 60(b)"°0 entitled the Board to relief from the Aguilar injunction. °3 Justice
O'Connor noted that in Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail,"' the Court found
independent of the private school and any religious institution. The Title I services themselves
must be "secular, neutral, and nonideological," and must "supplement, and in no case
supplant, the level of services" already provided by the private school.
Id. (citations omitted) (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 6321(a)(2) and 34 C.F.R. § 200.12(a) (1996)).
96. See id. at 2004-05. The first two of these programs involved transporting children to public
schools to receive after school Title I instruction and providing after school Title I services on private
school campuses. See id. at 2004. Both of these programs proved largely unsuccessful, so the NY
Board implemented a plan to provide the services on private school campuses during school hours. See
.id. It was this third plan that was evaluated in Aguilar. See id.
97. See id. at 2005; see also Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 407 (1985).
98. See Agostini, 117 S. Ct. at 2005. In Aguilar v. Felton, the Court held by a 5-4 ruling that the
"Title I program necessitated an 'excessive entanglement of church and state in the administration of
[Title I] benefits."' See id. (quoting Aguilar, 473 U.S. at 414). Subsequently, the NY Board was
permanently enjoined "from using funds for any plan or program under [Title ] to the extent that it
requires, authorizes or permits public school teachers and guidance counselors to provide teaching and
counseling services on the premises of sectarian schools within New York City." See id. (citing App.
to Pet. for Cert., No. 96-553 at A25-26).
99. See id. In complying with Aguilar and its ensuing injunction, the NY Board incurred additional
costs of approximately $15 million dollars annually. See id. These costs were incurred by the NY
Board in "providing computer-aided instruction, leasing sites and mobile instruction units [(vans)], and
transporting students to those sites." See id.
100. Hereinafter referred to collectively as the "Board."
101. See Agostini, 117 S. Ct. at 2006.
102. Rule 60(b) provides in relevant part:
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or a party's legal
representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: ... (5)
the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is
based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment
should have prospective application.
FED. R. Ctv. P. 60(b).
103. See Agostini, 117 S. Ct. at 2006-07.
104. 502 U.S. 367 (1992).
a Rule 60(b) motion to be a proper vehicle to seek relief from an injunction when
the moving party "can show 'a significant change either in factual conditions or in
law.""'1 5 The Board asserted that, under Rule 60(b)(5), changes in either the
factual conditions or the law entitled them to relief from the Aguilar injunction. "
First, the Board contended that the added costs of complying with the injunction
constituted a significant factual change.0 7 Second, the Board claimed that two
legal developments constituted a significant change in law: (1) a majority of the
justices believed that Aguilar should be overturned, 10 8 and (2) subsequent
Establishment Clause decisions had, in effect, overturned Aguilar." Justice
O'Connor concluded that the added costs did not constitute a factual change under
Rufo because the Board knew of the additional costs at the time Aguilar was
decided."0 Furthermore, Justice O'Connor concluded that the assertion of a
majority of the justices that Aguilar should be overturned did not constitute a
significant legal change that would afford the Board grounds for Rule 60(b) relief
from the Aguilar injunction."' Thus, the only hope for relief was to show that
subsequent Supreme Court decisions had, in effect, rendered Aguilar no longer
good law. 12
In the next section of the majority opinion, Justice O'Connor examined
whether Aguilar had been undermined by subsequent Establishment Clause
decisions." 3 In deciding this issue, Justice O'Connor examined the rationale of
Aguilar and its companion case, School District of Grand Rapids v. Ball.'..
In Ball, the Court evaluated a Michigan school district's Shared Time program
that provided remedial instruction to students in private schools. "5 In evaluating
the Shared Time program, the Court applied the three-pronged Lemon Test."6 The
Ball Court held that the Shared Time program failed the second prong because it
had the effect of advancing religion.' The Court reasoned that "teachers--even
105. See Agostini, 117 S. Ct. at 2006 (quoting Rufo, 502 U.S. at 384).
106. See id.
107. See id.
108. See id. at 2006-07 (citing Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S.
687 (1994)).
109. See id. at 2007 (citing Rosenberger v. Rectorand Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995);
Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1 (1993); and Witters v. Washington Dep't of Servs.
for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986)).
110. See Agostini, 117 S. Ct. at 2007.
111. See id.
112. See id.
113. See id. at 2008-17.
114. 473 U.S. 373 (1985), overruled in part by Agostini v. Felton, 117 S. Ct. 1997 (1997).
115. See id. at 375-76.
116. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971). For a program to survive a
constitutional challenge under the Establishment Clause through application of the Lemon Test, the
program must have a secular purpose, a primarily secular effect (i.e., an effect that does not "advance"
nor "inhibit" religion), and the program must not lead to "excessive government entanglement with
religion." See id.
117. See Ball, 473 U.S. at 385.
416
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those who were not employed by the private schools--might 'subtly (or overtly)
conform their instruction to the [pervasively sectarian] environment in which they
[taught],"' and this would impermissibly advance religion. "' The Ball Court also
found that the Shared Time program failed Lemon's second prong on two other
grounds. First, the presence of public school teachers on parochial school
campuses created a perception of a symbolic church and state union. "9 Second, the
Court found that the financing of the program subsidized the parochial school's
religious mission.' Because the Shared Time program could not satisfy the
Lemon Test, it was found unconstitutional.'
In Aguilar v. Felton, 2 the Court evaluated a Title I program similar to the
Shared Time program in Ball with the exception that, in Aguilar, the Board
monitored the religious content of the classes conducted with Title I public funds
in private schools.'23 The Aguilar Court concluded that the level of monitoring
necessary to ensure that Lemon's secular effect prong was satisfied would itself
constitute excessive entanglement, thus failing Lemon's excessive entanglement
prong. 1
24
Justice O'Connor concluded her examination of Ball and Aguilar by outlining
the assumptions upon which the decisions were made. 25 Justice O'Connor then
delineated how the Court's subsequent decisions had undermined these assump-
tions.'26 Justice O'Connor concluded that since Ball and Aguilar, there has been
a change in the Court's "understanding of the criteria used to assess whether aid
to religion has an impermissible effect."'27 This conclusion was based primarily
on two post-Aguilar Supreme Court decisions.
118. See Agostini, 117 S. Ct. at 2008 (alterations in original) (quoting Ball, 473 U.S. at 388).
119. See Ball, 473 U.S. at 391.
120. See id. at 385; see also Agostini, 117 S. Ct. at 2009.
121. See Ball, 473 U.S. at 397.
122. 473 U.S. 402 (1985), overruled by Agostini v. Felton, 117 S. Ct. 1997 (1997).
123. See id. at 409.
124. See id.; see also Agostini, 117 S. Ct. at 2009 (citing Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 619
(1971) and Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 370 (1975)).
125. Ball was based on the first three assumptions, and Aguilar added the fourth assumption:
(i) any public employee who works on the premises of a religious school is presumed to
inculcate religion in her work; (ii) the presence of public employees on private school premises
creates a symbolic union between church and state; ... (iii) any and all public aid that directly
aids the educational function of religious schools impermissibly finances religious
indoctrination, even if the aid reaches such schools as a consequence of private
decisionmaking . . . [(iv)] New York City's Title I program necessitated an excessive
government entanglement with religion because public employees who teach on the premises
of religious schools must be closely monitored to ensure that they do not inculcate religion.
Agostini, 117 S. Ct. at 2010.
126. See id. at 2010-16.
127. See id. at 2010.
First, Justice O'Connor noted that the Court in Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills
School District128 "abandoned the presumption erected in Meek and Ball that the
placement of public employees on parochial school grounds inevitably results in
the impermissible effect of state-sponsored indoctrination or constitutes a symbolic
union between government and religion."12 9 In Zobrest, a deaf student attempted
to bring his state-employed sign-interpreter onto the campus of a Roman Catholic
High School to interpret lectures. 3 0 The Zobrest Court held that this practice was
not a constitutional violation.'3 ' Justice O'Connor stated that in Zobrest "[w]e
refused to presume that a publicly employed interpreter would be pressured by the
pervasively sectarian surroundings to inculcate religion by 'add[ing] to [or]
subtract[ing] from' the lectures translated."' 3 2 For this reason, Justice O'Connor
concluded that "Zobrest therefore expressly rejected the notion--relied on in Ball
and Aguilar-that, solely because of the presence on private school property, a
public employee will be presumed to inculcate religion in the students."'33
Furthermore, Justice O'Connor noted that Zobrest rejected the assumption that
having a state employee on the campus of a private school created a "symbolic
link" between church and state. ' Thus, Zobrest created a significant change in the
law. 13
5
Second, Justice O'Connor noted that in Witters v. Washington Department of
Services for the Blind,136 the Court "departed from the rule... that all government
aid that directly aids the educational function of religious schools is invalid.' 37 In
Witters, a blind person attempted to use a state grant to obtain religious training
from a Christian college.13 The Witters Court held that the Establishment Clause
did not prevent the state from awarding the grant to the student, even though the
state knew it would be used to obtain religious training from a religious educational
institution. '39 The Court reasoned that the grant money actually went to the student,
who in turn made the individual choice to use the grant money to acquire training
from a religious institution. 40
Applying the reasoning in Zobrest and Witters to the Shared Time program in
Ball and the Title I program in Aguilar, Justice O'Connor concluded that these
programs would not, "as a matter of law, be deemed to have the effect of advancing
128. 509 U.S. 1 (1993).
129. See Agostini, 117 S. Ct. at 2010.
130. See Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 4.
131. Seeid. atl3.
132. See Agostini, 117 S. Ct. at 2010-11 (alterations in original) (quoting Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 13).
133. See id. at 2011.
134. See id.
135. See id.
136. 474 U.S. 481 (1986).
137. See Agostini, 117 S. Ct. at 2011; see Witters, 474 U.S. at 487.
138. See Witters, 474 U.S. at 483.
139. See id. at 486-87.
140. See id. at 487.
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religion through indoctrination.""' Justice O'Connor then examined the new
criteria established by Zobrest and Witters to be used in ascertaining whether a
program impermissibly advances religion.'42 Justice O'Connor concluded that
Zobrest and Witters stand for the proposition that in determining whether a
program has an impermissible effect of advancing religion, the Court should first
determine if the aid creates a "financial incentive to undertake religious indoctrina-
tion,"'43 and second, determine whether "the aid is allocated on the basis of neutral,
secular criteria that neither favor nor disfavor religion, and is made available to
both religious and secular beneficiaries on a nondiscriminatory basis." 14 Justice
O'Connor then applied these criteria to the Title I program in New York City and
concluded that the program did not create an incentive to the beneficiaries to
change religious beliefs nor was it allocated on a basis that favored or disfavored
religion.'45 Thus, New York's program did not advance religion through
indoctrination in violation of the Establishment Clause and Lemon's second
prong. 146
Next, Justice O'Connor examined Aguilar's conclusion that monitoring of the
Title I program constituted excessive entanglement between church and state, a
violation of Lemon's third prong. 47 Justice O'Connor asserted that the grounds
relied on in Aguilar did not constitute excessive entanglement. 14  However,
Zobrest nullified the Aguilar presumption that public employees will inculcate
religion merely by being on a parochial school campus.' 149  Furthermore, the
reasoning that the Title I program would require administrative cooperation and
might lead to political divisiveness was not enough to amount to excessive
entanglement. 50 Thus, Justice O'Connor concluded that New York's Title I
program did not violate any of the criteria used in evaluating Establishment Clause
141. See Agostini, 117 S. Ct. at 2012.
142. See id. at 2014.
143. See id.
144. See id.
145. See id.
146. See id.; see also Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 613 (1971) (holding that a statute's
"principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion").
147. See Agostini, 117 S. Ct. at 2014-16.
148. See id. at 2015. Justice O'Connor reiterated that Aguilar's excessive entanglement finding was
based on three grounds: "(i) the program would require 'pervasive monitoring by public authorities'
to ensure that Title I employees did not inculcate religion; (ii) the program required 'administrative
cooperation' between the Board and parochial schools; and (iii) the program might increase the dangers
of 'political divisiveness."' See id. (quoting Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 413-14 (1985)).
149. See id. at 2016.
150. See id. at 2015.
419
cases. 151
Next, Justice O'Connor addressed the issue of stare decisis, concluding that
the doctrine did not prevent the Court from recognizing a change in the law.152
Justice O'Connor reasoned that where there has been a significant change in~law,
stare decisis does not prevent the Court from overturning a previous ruling.153
Thus, Justice O'Connor reasoned, because Zobrest and Witters significantly
changed the law since the Aguilar decision, the Court was permitted to overturn
Aguilar.'
54
Finally, Justice O'Connor concluded that the Establishment Clause law had
significantly changed since the Aguilar decision. ' Thus, a motion for relief from
the Aguilar decision and its ensuing injunction pursuant to Rule 60(b) was
appropriate. 1'6 However, Justice O'Connor made clear that even where a precedent
appears to rely on law that has significantly changed, the Court of Appeals should,
nevertheless, rely on the controlling precedent and leave it to the Supreme Court
to overrule the prior decision.'57
B. Justice Souter's Dissenting Opinion
Justice Souter, joined by Justice Stevens and Justice Ginsburg, and Justice
Breyer as to Part II, authored a very critical dissenting opinion.' Justice Souter
began with an examination of the Board's use of Rule 60(b) to seek rehearing of
the twelve-year-old Aguilar ruling. 159  Adopting the reasoning of Justice
Ginsburg,"'° Justice Souter concluded that the use of Rule 60(b) in this manner was
erroneous.
6
Next, Justice Souter analyzed the Court's decisions in Aguilar and Ball.'
62
Justice Souter reiterated that in Aguilar and Ball, the Court held that there was a
violation of the Establishment Clause where public school teachers provided
services on the campuses of parochial schools during school hours. 63 Unlike the
151. See id. at 2016. Justice O'Connor stated, "we have looked to 'the character and purposes of the
institutions that are benefit[t]ed, the nature of the aid that the State provides, and the resulting
relationship between the government and religious authority.' Similarly, we have assessed a law's
'effect' by examining the character of the institutions benefit[t]ed." Id. at 2015 (citations omitted)
(quoting Lemon, 403 U.S. at 615).
152. See id. at 2016.
153. See id.
154. See id. at 2016-17.
155. See id. at 2017.
156. See id.
157. See id.
158. See id. at 2019-26 (Souter, J., dissenting).
159. See id. at 2019 (Souter, J., dissenting).
160. See id. at 2026-28 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); see also infra notes 191-201 and accompanying
text.
161. See id. at 2019 (Souter, J., dissenting).
162. See id. at 2019-22 (Souter, J., dissenting).
163. See id. at 2019 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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majority, who believed Aguilar was wrongly decided and no longer good law,
Justice Souter asserted that "Aguilar was a correct and sensible decision, and my
only reservation about its opinion is that the emphasis on the excessive entangle-
ment produced by monitoring religious instructional content obscured those facts
that independently called for the application of two central tenets of Establishment
Clause jurisprudence."'" These tenets, according to Justice Souter, forbid
government from directly subsidizing religion or acting in a way that may be
viewed as endorsing religion.'65 Justice Souter stated that these two tenets were
violated in Aguilar and Ball."6 For this reason, the programs evaluated in Aguilar
and Ball were correctly found to be in violation of the Establishment Clause. 67
Although programs providing Title I services to parochial school students off
campus were not at issue inAgostini orAguilar, Justice Souter concluded that these
programs would be less likely to subsidize religion in violation of the Establish-
ment Clause.
68
After arguing that Aguilar and Ball were correctly decided, Justice Souter
turned to the majority's contention that Aguilar and the part of Ball addressing the
Shared Time program had been effectively overruled by subsequent Supreme Court
decisions. 69 Justice Souter reasoned that the majority's, reliance on Zobrest v.
Catalina Foothills School District"' was inappropriate because Zobrest was
factually distinguishable from both Aguilar and Ball.7' For this reason, Souter
argued that it was impermissible for the majority to use Zobrest to support the
conclusion that the main presumption erected by Ball and Meek had been
abandoned.'72 In Zobrest, the aid of a sign language interpreter was provided to the
student, whereas in Aguilar and Ball, the aid was provided directly to the
164. See id. at 2020 (Souter, J., dissenting). But see id. at 2016 (holding thatAguilar and Ball were
no longer good law).
165. See id. at 2020 (Souter, J., dissenting).
166. See id. at 2021 (Souter, J., dissenting). According to Souter, the aid in Ball andAguilar directly
subsidized religion because it "flowed directly to the [religious] schools in the form of classes and
programs." See id. (Souter, J., dissenting). Furthermore, Justice Souter reasoned that placing public
school teachers and private school teachers on private school campuses could reasonably be viewed as
government endorsement of religion. See id. at 2022 (Souter, J., dissenting).
167. See id. at 2021 (Souter, J., dissenting).
168. See id. at 2022 (Souter, J., dissenting).
169. See id. at 2022-25 (Souter, J., dissenting).
170. 509 U.S. 1 (1993).
171. See Agostini, 117 S. Ct. at 2022 (Souter, J., dissenting).
172. See id. (Souter, J., dissenting). The presumption was that "the placement of public employees
on parochial school grounds inevitably results in the impermissible effect of state-sponsored
indoctrination or constitutes a symbolic union between government and religion." See id. at 2010.
Justice Souter responded, "Zobrest... is no such sanction for overruling Aguilar or any portion of
Ball." Id. at 2023 (Souter, J., dissenting).
schools.'73 Justice Souter concluded that the Zobrest Court held that a public
employee's presence on a parochial school campus does not violate the Establish-
ment Clause only when the circumstances match those in Zobrest.'74 Justice Souter
asserted that the majority's finding that a public employee on the campus of a
religious school will not inculcate religion cannot rely on Zobrest and, thus, this
finding itself creates "fresh law."' As to the issue of the "symbolic link" created
by having public employees on private school campuses, Justice Souter reasoned
that:
Zobrest did not, implicitly or otherwise, repudiate the view that the involvement of
public teachers in the instruction provided within sectarian schools looks like a
partnership or union and implies approval of the sectarian aim. On the subject of
symbolic unions and the strength of their implications, the lesson of Zobrest is
merely less is less.'76
Thus, Justice Souter argued, the majority's conclusion that there had been a
significant change in law, entitling the Board to relief from the Aguilar decision
under Rule 60(b), was inappropriate because Zobrest did not have the capacity to
change a law to which it did not apply.'77
Justice Souter then took issue with the majority's treatment of the second
assumption upon which Ball was decided: "any and all public aid that directly aids
the educational function of religious schools impermissibly finances religious
indoctrination, even if the aid reaches such schools as a consequence of private
decision-making."' 78 Justice Souter concluded that the majority misused Witters
v. Washington Department of Services for the Blind'79 and Zobrest to hold that this
rule had been abandoned. 0 In Witters, as in Zobrest, the aid was provided to an
individual student who in turn decided where to use the aid.'' As such, the aid was
not a direct aid to religion; whereas the aid in both Ball and Aguilar went directly
to the religious educational institution."2 Justice Souter also disagreed with the
majority's contention that Aguilar and Ball did not adequately consider that "aid
allocated under neutral, secular criteria is less likely to have the effect of advancing
173. See id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
174. See id. (Souter, J., dissenting). In her majority opinion, Justice O'Connor took direct issue with
this contention: "it was Zobrest--and not this case--that created 'fresh law.' Our refusal to limit Zobrest
to its facts despite its rationale does not, in our view, amount to a 'misreading' of precedent." See id.
at 2011.
175. See id. at 2023 (Souter, J., dissenting).
176. Id. at 2023 (Souter, J., dissenting).
177. See id. at 2023 (Souter, J., dissenting).
178. See id. at 2010.
179. 474 U.S. 481 (1986).
180. See Agostini, 117 S. Ct. at 2023-24 (Souter, J., dissenting).
181. See id. at 2024 (Souter, J., dissenting).
182. See id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
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religion."' 3 Justice Souter further reasoned that "[i]f a scheme of government aid
results in support for religion in some substantial degree, or in endorsement of its
value, the formal neutrality of the scheme does not render the Establishment Clause
helpless or the holdings in Aguilar and Ball inapposite."' 4 Thus, Justice Souter
concluded that even where aid is provided on a neutral basis, it may still run afoul
of the Establishment Clause.'85
Justice Souter concluded his opinion with an examination of the issue of
precedent." 6 Justice Souter was critical of the majority's view that stare decisis
was not an obstacle because Aguilar and Ball were limited by Witters and Zobrest
"to the point of abandoned doctrine."'8 7 Justice Souter asserted that since the
Aguilar decision, the law had not been abandoned and had, in fact, remained
unchanged. 88 Justice Souter further asserted that since Aguilar, the facts
surrounding the Title I program in New York had remained unchanged. 9 Because
the law and the facts had remained unchanged, Justice Souter concluded, the
doctrine of stare decisis required that the Aguilar decision be left intact."
C. Justice Ginsburg's Dissenting Opinion
Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, and Breyer, wrote a
separate dissenting opinion to examine the use of Rule 60(b) to rehear the Aguilar
issue."' Justice Ginsburg was suspicious of this new use of Rule 60(b) 92 to seek
183. See id. at 2025 (Souter, J., dissenting).
184. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
185. See id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
186. See id. at 2025-26 (Souter, J., dissenting).
187. See id. at 2025 (Souter, J., dissenting).
188. See id. (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter reasoned:
[N]o case has held that there need be no concern about a risk that publicly paid school teachers
may further religious doctrine; no case has repudiated the distinction between direct and
substantial aid and aid that is indirect and incidental; no case has held that fusing public and
private faculties in one religious school does not create an impermissible union or carry an
impermissible endorsement; and no case has held that direct subsidization of religious
education is constitutional or that the assumption of a portion of a religious school's teaching
responsibility is not direct subsidization.
Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
189. See id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
190. See id. at 2025-26 (Souter, J., dissenting).
191. See id. at 2026 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
192. At oral argument, Justice Ginsburg questioned Acting Solicitor General Walter Dellinger about
the use of Rule 60(b) as a vehicle to seek rehearing of the Aguilar issue:
Q: I do not know of any use, ever, of 60(b) such as we see here, essentially to gain rehearing
by this Court, so if you could spend just a couple of moments-
A: [W]e do not know of another instance in which Rule 60(b) has been used in this way.
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rehearing, and would have limited the Board to the use of United States Supreme
Court Rule 44.193 Justice Ginsburg proceeded to outline the appropriate use of
Rule 60(b). 194 Rule 60(b) is a tool to be used by trial courts where a party is
seeking modification of a final judgment where there has been either a change in
the law or in the facts since the final judgment.95 Rule 60(b) motions are reviewed
by appellate courts only for abuse of discretion.'96 Furthermore, Justice Ginsburg
stated that "[a]s we recognized in our unanimous opinion in Browder, 'an appeal
from denial of Rule 60(b) relief does not bring up the underlying judgment for
review."" 97 Thus, Justice Ginsburg concluded that it was inappropriate for the
Court to hear "relitigation of the legal or factual claims underlying the original
judgment" by use of a Rule 60(b) motion.'98 Justice Ginsburg also criticized the
majority's contention that it was not deciding whether Aguilar should be overruled,
but whether it had been frustrated to the extent that it was no longer good law. 99
Justice Ginsburg also argued that Agostini was not the appropriate vehicle to
decide whether the Court had abandoned the jurisprudential grounds upon which
Aguilar was based."° She would have preferred to wait for another case to make
its way to the Supreme Court, being appealed on its merits rather than relying on
Rule 60(b).2 '
See Oral Argument at 11, Agostini v. Felton, 117 S. Ct. 1997 (1997) (Nos. 96-552 and 96-553).
193. See Agostini, 117 S. Ct. at 2026 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). United States Supreme Court Rule
44 provides, in relevant part:
1. Any petition for the rehearing of any judgment or decision of the Court on the merits shall
be filed within 25 days after entry of the judgment or decision, unless the Court or a Justice
shortens or extends the time.... The petition shall be presented together with certification of
counsel (or of a party unrepresented by counsel) that it is presented in good faith and not for
delay.... A petition for rehearing is not subject to oral argument and will not be granted
except by a majority of the Court, at the instance of a Justice who concurred in the judgment
or decision.
SUP. CT. R. 44.
194. See Agostini, 117 S. Ct. at 2026-27 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
195. See id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S 367,
384 (1992)).
196. See id. at 2027 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
197. Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Browder v. Director, Dep't of Corrections of 111., 434
U.S. 257, 263 n.7 (1978)).
198. See id. at 2027 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). It was for this reason that Justice Ginsburg
determined that the only issue the Court should have heard regarding the modification of the Aguilar
injunction should have been whether "the District Court abuse[d] its discretion when it concluded that
neither the facts nor the law had so changed as to warrant alteration of the injunction." See id.
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
199. See id. at 2028 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Justice Ginsburg reasoned that "nothing can disguise
the reality that, until today, Aguilar had not been overruled. Good or bad, it was in fact the law." Id.
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
200. See id. at 2028 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
201. See id. at 2027-28 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Justice Ginsburg said that it would be more
appropriate to wait for Committee for Public' Education & Religious Liberty v. Secretary, U.S.
Department of Education, 942 F. Supp. 842 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) (PEARL I1), or Helms v. Cody, 856 F.
Supp. 1102 (E.D. La. 1994), to make their way on appeal to the Supreme Court. See id. at 2028.
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V. IMPACT
A. Immediate Impact: Public School Teachers in Parochial Schools
Effective immediately, upon the Court's rendering of the Agostini decision,
public school teachers were permitted to provide Title I services on parochial
school campuses.2' 2 In July 1997, the United States Department of Education set
out guidelines for how LEAs ought to relate to the Agostini decision.2 °3 These
guidelines, published in a question and answer format, 204 addressed some important
questions and gave specific recommendations to LEAs. The Department of
Education, under these guidelines, strongly urged schools to implement the
safeguards that New York used, even though the AgostiniCourt did not expressly
rule that this was necessary.2 °5 The Department further urged teachers to provide
Title I services in areas free of religious symbols. 6 If the private school chose not
to make space available for Title I services, the Title I services must be provided
at another location. 7 Furthermore, no school-wide programs can be offered in
private schools.2' As to the scope of Agostini, the guidelines stated, "[Tihe
implication of the Court's ruling is that there is no constitutional bar to public
school employees providing educational services in private schools under other
Justice Ginsburg reasoned that waiting would be the appropriate course to take because "maintenance
of integrity in the interpretation of procedural rules, preservation of the responsive, non-agenda-setting
character of this Court, and avoidance of invitations to reconsider old cases based on 'speculat[ions]
on chances from changes in [the Court's membership]."' See id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting
Illinois v. Illinois Cent. R.R. Co., 184 U.S. 77, 92 (1902)). Justice Ginsburg also noted that the only
remaining member of the Aguilar majority was Justice Stevens. See id. at 2026 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting).
202. See Agostini, 117 S. Ct. 2016 (overturning the Aguilar decision that prohibited public school
teachers from providing Title I services on parochial school campuses).
203. See U.S. Department of Education, Guidance on the Supreme Court's Decision in Agostini v.
Felton and Title I (Part A) of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (visited Sept. 30, 1998)
<http://www.ed.gov/legislation/ESEA/feltguid.html>.
204. The guidelines, in the format of twenty-five questions and answers, addressed the following
issues that would affect LEAs afterAgostini: locations and types of services, contacts and activities in
private schools, use and disposal of mobile vans, capital expense funds, "off-the-top" requirements,
school-wide programs, new private school children, and other federal programs. See id.
205. See id. at Question 3.
206. See id. at Question 9.
207. See id. at Question 12.
208. See id. at Question 23 (reasoning that the private school students and not the private schools
are entitled to Title'I services).
Federal programs under similar circumstances. 2 °9 The guidelines also addressed
Agostini's implication to programs in other states.21°
B. Future Impact
Perhaps the most significant future impact of Agostini will be the role it plays
in the ongoing debate over private school vouchers.2 1 Vouchers allow parents to
pay parochial school tuition with public money, affording more parents the choice
of whether to send their children to private schools. 212 These programs are seen by
some as the most controversial educational issue regarding church-state relations.
213
Because courts have often been hostile to the use of public funds to finance private
education,21 4 voucher proponents faced an uphill battle when arguing that voucher
programs did not offend the Establishment Clause. However, with Agostini's
relaxing of the Lemon Test, proponents of voucher programs have new hope that
the programs will be found not to be in conflict with the Establishment Clause.215
These proponents urge that vouchers can pass the new Lemon scrutiny.216 It should
be noted that the Agostini Court relied primarily on the same two cases to uphold
the constitutionality of New York's Title I program that voucher proponents have
209. See id. at Question 25.
210. See, e.g., Mary Maushard, Ruling Helps Parochial Pupils in Md, BALTIMORE SUN, June 27,
1997, at lB (discussing the impact of the Agostini ruling for Maryland schools); David G. Savage,
Justices Lower a Church-State Barrier; Court: Action Reverses 1985 Decision that Barred Teachers
Paid by Taxpayers from Tutoring Pupils Enrolled in Parochial Schools on School Grounds, L.A.
TIMES, June 24, 1997, at A 10 (discussing the impact of the Agostini ruling for the Los Angeles Unified
School District, California's largest school system).
211. See Ball, supra note 6, at 261-62; see also Clint Bolick, Pacific Vouchers: If They Work Here
.. , WALL ST. J., June 10, 1997, at A18 (examining a school choice program in the Mariana Islands).
212. See Frank R. Kemerer, The Constitutionality of School Vouchers, 101 ED. L. REP. 17, 17
(1995).
213. See Edward Felsenthal, High Court Rules Public Teachers Can Work in Religious Schools,
WALL ST. J., June 24, 1997, at B8.
214. See Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 794 (1973)
(holding impermissible a law allowing tax credits to parents with children attending nonpublic schools);
Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S. 825, 834 (1973) (holding tuition reimbursements to parents of parochial
school children to be a violation of the Establishment Clause). But see Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388,
403-04 (1983) (upholding a law allowing for a state income tax deduction for amounts paid for tuition,
books, and transportation of school children).
215. See, e.g., Art Moore, Justices Void Ruling on Remedial Teachers, CHRISTIANITY TODAY, Aug.
11, 1997, at 53; see also Peter Applebome, Parochial Schools Ruling Heartens Voucher Backers:
Court Seen as Receptive to School Aid Plan, N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 1997, at B5; Linda Greenhouse,
Court Eases Curb on Aid to Schools with Church Ties: Upends Precedent, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 1997,
at Al; Tamara Henry and Lori Sham, Schools Decision Could Affect Rulings on Vouchers, USA
TODAY, June 24, 1997, at 3A.
216. See Michael E. Hartmann, Spitting Distance: Tents Full of Religious Schools in Choice
Programs, the Camel's Nose of State Labor-Law Application to their Relations with Lay Faculty
Members, and the First Amendment's Tether, 6 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 553, 600-01 (1997).
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been relying on to argue the constitutionality of voucher programs.
217
Although the Clinton Administration strongly supported the decision reached
by the Agostini Court,2 18 it is unlikely that voucher proponents will find such
support in their debate. Richard W. Riley, U.S. Secretary of Education, has
outlined the position of the Administration in two pointed speeches. 219 In a speech
before the National Press Club in Washington, D.C., Riley stated, "Vouchers are
wrong .... Vouchers undermine a 200-year American commitment to the common
school."22 At the National School Boards Association 24th Annual Federal
Relations Conference in Washington, D.C., Riley asserted, "Vouchers provide no
accountability, and they would drain money from public schools at the worst
possible time--when our classrooms are bulging with record numbers of students
.... Vouchers are a bad idea."22'
But voucher proponents will likely find a political ally in the Republican
National Committee ("RNC"). In an RNC Press Release, Chairman Jim Nicholson
stated, "I challenge Bill Clinton to open the school doors of America, to help
parents choose the best schools for their children .... [I]t's time to achieve a civil
rights victory for 1997 by supporting school choice. 222 On October 10, 1997, the
Republican-controlled House of Representatives passed a bill that would allow for
the institution of a voucher program in the District of Columbia. 3 Thus, while the
Clinton Administration is not a likely ally to voucher proponents, the Republican
controlled legislature would likely be more supportive.2' And the only branch of
government that has yet to take a stand on the voucher issue--the judiciary --seems
to be leaning toward approval.2
217. See Agostini v. Felton, 117 S. Ct. 1997, 2014-16 (1997) (relying on Witters and Zobrest to find
that New York's Title I program did not run afoul of the Establishment Clause); see also Kemerer,
supra note 212, at 21-23 (observing that Witters and Zobrest make it likely that voucher programs will
be found constitutional).
218. See B rief for Petitioner at *9-* 14, 1997 WL 97077, Agostini v. Felton, 117 S. Ct. 1997 (1997)
(No. 96-552, 96-553).
219. See Richard W. Riley, What Really Matters in American Education, Remarks at the National
Press Club (Sept. 23, 1997) (visited Sept. 30, 1998) <http://www.ed.gov/Speeches/09-
1997/970923.html> [hereinafter What Really Matters in American Education]; Richard W. Riley,
Remarks at the National School Boards Association 24th Annual Federal Relations Network
Conference (Jan. 27, 1997) (visited Sept. 29, 1998) <http://www.ed.gov/Speeches/01-1997/nsba.html>
[hereinafter Remarks at the National School Boards Association].
220. What Really Matters in American Education, supra note 219.
221. Remarks at the National School Boards Association, supra note 219.
222. RNC News Release (Sept. 25, 1997) (visited Dec. 16, 1997) <http://www.mc.org>.
223. See H.R. 2607, 105th Cong. (1997).
224. See RNC News Release, supra note 222.
225. See Agostini v. Felton, 117 S. Ct. 1997, 2016 (1997) (extending Zobrest and Witters to find that
government aid that goes directly to a parochial school does not offend the Establishment Clause).
There are currently voucher programs working their way through court systems
that may soon provide the High Court with the opportunity to take a stand on the
constitutionality of vouchers.226
In Campbell v. Manchester Board of School Directors,227 a parent who was
forced by a compulsory education statute to send his son to a parochial school
because his town did not have a public school, requested reimbursement from the
state for this expense.228 The Vermont Supreme Court held that such a reimburse-
ment program did not violate the Establishment Clause.2 9 Relying on Mueller v.
Allen23° and Witters v. Washington Department of Services for the Blind,23' the
Campbell court concluded that the Vermont reimbursement program satisfied the
Lemon Test because it had a secular effect, did not advance religion, and Vermont
had taken adequate measures to limit entanglement into religion.232
In 1995, the Milwaukee school system extended a voucher program to
parochial schools.233 The Wisconsin Supreme Court was unable to reach a decision
as to the constitutionality of the program (the justices split 3-3) and was forced to
leave it to the lower courts to resolve the issue.234  However, the Wisconsin
Supreme Court subsequently ruled, in Jackson v. Benson, that the school choice
program did not violate the Establishment Clause or the Wisconsin Constitution.235
Thus, school choice programs are currently constitutional in Wisconsin.
A voucher program in Cleveland has also encountered judicial challenges, but
the issue is far from being permanently resolved. 236 In Simmons-Harris v. Goff, a
unanimous Ohio Court of Appeals struck down Cleveland's one-year-old voucher
program.237 The court reasoned that the program violated both state and federal
226. The Supreme Court has yet to hear a case involving the constitutionality of vouchers.
Conversely, the controversy is in full swing in state courts. See, e.g., Simmons-Harris v. Goff, Nos.
96APE08-982, 96APE08-991, 1997 WL 217583 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997) (funding scholarship program
violates the Establishment Clause); Campbell v. Manchester Bd. of Sch. Dirs., 641 A.2d 352 (Vt.
1994).
227. 641 A.2d 352 (Vt. 1994).
228. See id. at 354.
229. See id. at 361.
230. 463 U.S. 388 (1983).
231. 474 U.S. 481 (1986).
232. See Campbell, 641 A.2d at 358-61.
233. See Jackson v. Benson, 570 N.W.2d 407, 411 (Wis. Ct. App. 1997), rev'd, 578 N.W.2d 602
(Wis. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 466 (1998).
234. See Wisconsin ex rel. Thompson v. Jackson, 546 N.W.2d 140, 142 (Wis. 1996); see also Nat
Hentoff, Public Funds for Religious Schools? Fail Kids Want Vouchers, VILLAGE VOICE, Aug. 19,
1997, at 26..
235. See Jackson v. Benson, 578 N.W.2d 602,607 (Wis. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 466 (1998);
see also WIS. CONST. art 1, § 18. Although this case would have allowed the United States Supreme
Court to resolve the voucher issue, the Court declined the opportunity. See Jackson v. Benson, 119 S.
Ct. 466 (1998) (denying certiorari).
236. See Simmons-Hais v. Goff, Nos. 96APE08-982, 96APE08-991, 1997 WL 217583 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1997).
237. Seeid.at*16.
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constitutions by providing aid to religion.23 However, the Ohio Supreme Court has
stayed the Court of Appeals' decision, pending appeal.23 9
Another issue that will have to be addressed by voucher proponents involves
the "application of state labor law to relations between lay faculty and religious
choice schools employing them."'  One commentator warns that althoughAgostini
may increase the likelihood that a school choice or voucher program would not
involve excessive entanglement, this same reasoning may prevent religious schools
that participate in a school choice program "from subsequently successfully
arguing that state labor-law application to them is too excessively entangling to be
constitutionally permissible."'"
C. Judicial Impact
1. The Lemon Test Revisited
Perhaps the most significant judicial impact of Agostini is the effect it has had
on the Lemon Test.242 The first prong of the test--secular purpose--has not been
substantially altered by Agostini.243 As for the second prong--secular effect--the
Court asserted that mere governmental presence and neutral aid would not be
enough to find a "secular effect."' But the Court made the most significant
modification with regard to the third prong--excessive entanglement.245 The fact
that the excessive entanglement prong has been de-emphasized will have a
profound impact on church-state litigation.' Because the Court is no longer likely
to find excessive entanglement, "violations of the Establishment Clause may
become as fleeting as findings of intentional discrimination under the Equal
238. See id. at*10.
239. See Simmons-Harris v. Goff, 681 N.E.2d 938 (Ohio 1997).
240. See Hartmann, supra note 216, at 601.
241. See id.; South Jersey Catholic Sch. Teachers Org. v. St. Theresa of the Infant Jesus Church
Elem. Sch., 696 A.2d 709, 722-23 (N.J. 1997) (holding that although lay teachers had the right to
organize and engage in collective bargaining, such bargaining ability was substantially limited by the
First Amendment's Religion Clauses, and that collective bargaining did not violate the Establishment
Clause or Free Exercise Clause).
242. See Hartmann, supra note 216, at 600-01.
243. See Agostini v. Felton, 117 S. Ct. 1997, 2010 (1997).
244. See id. at 2014.
245. See id. at 2016.
246. See Art Moore, Justices Void Ruling on Remedial Teachers, CHRIsTIANITY TODAY, Aug. 11,
1997, at 53.
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It is important to recognize that the Lemon Test is not dead.24 Indeed, the test
has been modified, but it has not been discarded. 9 Lemon is still good law,
although it may not be the best law. ° Lemon has become a flexible tool that the
Court uses when the situation is ripe.25'
2. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)
The Agostini dissenters registered great concern about the procedural
mechanism involved in the case. 2 Justices Souter and Ginsburg both asserted that
the merits of the Aguilar decision could not be reheard using a Rule 60(b)
211motion.
Justice O'Connor responded in the majority opinion to the concerns and
criticisms of the dissenters.254 The dissenters' fear of a deluge of litigation using
Rule 60(b) was unfounded, Justice O'Connor reasoned, because use of Rule 60(b)
in this manner was limited to the facts of Agostini.211 Justice O'Connor further
247. See Bernard James; States Prevail in First Amendment Cases, NAT'LL.J., August 11, 1997, at
B 13.
248. See Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 395 n.7 (1993);
see also Daniel 0. Conkle, Lemon Lives, 43 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 865, 882 (1993) (concluding that
"Lemon lives, at least in spirit, at least for now."); Ira C. Lupu, Comment, Which Old Witch?: A
Comment on Professor Paulsen's Lemon Is Dead, 43 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 883, 886 (1993)
(predicting correctly that "Lemon's three component requirements will survive, even if in a different
form than that which prevailed in the 1970s"). But cf Michael Stokes Paulsen, Lemon Is Dead, 43
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 795, 861-62 (1993) (concluding that the Lemon Test is dead because the Court
failed to consistently apply it and the Lemon test has been replaced by the "coercion" test of Lee v.
Weisman).
249. See James, supra note 247, at B13.
250. See, e.g., Stark v. Independent Sch. Dist., 123 F.3d 1068, 1075 (8th Cir. 1997) (applying the
relaxed standards of Agostini rather than the strict standards of Lemon in deciding an Establishment
Clause issue). For the Lemon Test to be applied appropriately, it must be applied as interpreted and
modified by Agostini. See Agostini, 117 S. Ct. at 2014-16.
251. Such use of the Lemon Test is not without criticism. Justice Scalia recently quipped:
Like some ghoul in a late night horror movie that repeatedly sits up in its grave and shuffles
abroad, after being repeatedly killed and buried, Lemon stalks our Establishment Clause
jurisprudence once again, frightening the little children and school attorneys .... It is there
to scare us (and our audience) when we wish it to do so, but we can command it to return to
the tomb at will. When we wish to strike down a practice it forbids, we invoke it; when we
wish to uphold the practice it forbids, we ignore it entirely .... Such a docile and useful
monster is worth keeping around, at least in a somnolent state; one never knows when one
might need him.
Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 398-99 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citations omitted). Justice Scalia has also
advocated the complete abandonment of the secular effect prong of the Lemon test. See Edwards v.
Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 639-40 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
252. See Agostini, 117 S. Ct. at 2026-28 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
253. See id. at 2019 (Souter, J., dissenting) and 2026 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
254. See id. at 2018.
255. See id.
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asserted that it was not necessary to wait for a "better vehicle" because this act of
waiting would be unfair to the state of New York, which would be required to
languish under the unjust Aguilar injunction in the meantime. 56
Even with Justice O'Connor's defense of the use of Rule 60(b) in Agostini, an
attempt to use Rule 60(b) to seek rehearing of the merits of a decision will likely
fail. 7 Justice Ginsburg noted that even the majority would be unwilling to extend
the use of Rule 60(b) beyond the facts outlined in Agostini.58 Still, the willingness
of the majority to rehear the Aguilar case creates uncertainty as to the proper use
of Rule 60(b). 59
VI. CONCLUSION
Establishment Clause jurisprudence has taken a sharp turn with Agostini's
modification of the Lemon Test. As a result, states will likely prevail in Establish-
ment Clause cases where challenged statutes do not blatantly offend the Constitu-
tion.2" School choice proponents also have a new tool to use in the on-going
debate over the constitutionality of private school vouchers.261' Although the
Agostini Court did not address the issue of vouchers, the Court relied on the same
cases to overrule Aguilar that school choice proponents are using to argue for the
constitutionality of vouchers.2 62 As for the procedural issue of the correct use of
Rule 60(b) to seek rehearing of an adjudicated issue, such use will likely be
inappropriate unless the facts closely parallel those of Agostini.263
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256. See id.
257. See id. at 2026 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (recognizing the limits of the Agostini holding).
258. See id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
259. See id. at 2018.
260. See supra notes 211-17 and accompanying text.
261. See supra notes 211-41 and accompanying text.
262. See supra note 217 and accompanying text.
263. See supra notes 257-59 and accompanying text.

